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European Integration and the Credit Channel Transmission of Monetary Policy 
1. Introduction 
The introduction of the single currency has accelerated the process of consolidation and financial 
integration, not only in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but in the whole European 
Union (EU), in which the new member states also have a voice, in spite of the possible 
heterogeneous nature of their financial systems. 
The process of financial integration is, on one hand, a necessary pre-requisite for the adoption of 
the single currency and the implementation of the single monetary policy, with the predominance 
of the banking intermediation in the context of the EU. On the other hand, this process raises the 
potential to incite liquidity crises, which could become contagious and affect the increasingly 
integrated European financial system. 
More efficient credit sectors should contribute to the economic benefits of the other sectors and 
agents which use financial services and they also represent a necessary condition for the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
According to the credit and lending view, the effectiveness of monetary policy depends basically 
on the banking system, since imperfections, such as asymmetric information and the subsequent 
phenomena of adverse selection and moral hazard, exist in the capital markets, which increase the 
particular difficulties felt by some economic agents to finance their investment and consumption 
plans. Under these conditions, central banks control the supply of money, but the banking 
institutions also play an important role in the money-creation process, as well as in the 
mobilisation and allocation of financial resources.  
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In addition, more efficient banking sectors are generally recognised as a necessary condition for 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and the way that banks adapt lending in response 
to monetary policy decisions varies according to their specific political and economic environment. 
However, there is no agreement on the precise specification of the ways in which monetary policy 
influences the economy. Hence, it is an area meriting further investigation (Goddart et al., 2007). 
 
Following these vectors of research, this paper seeks to contribute to the analysis of the financial 
integration, the importance of bank performance conditions and the bank lending channel 
transmission of monetary policy in the EU countries since 1999. 
The main contributions are to be found in: 
1) the use of quarterly data, between Q1 1999 and Q3 2006, for 26 EU countries (the only 
exception is Luxembourg, for which it was not possible to obtain all the data). This is in contrast 
with most of the empirical studies in this area, which analyse only sub-sets of EU countries – all of 
the EMU,  or some of its more significant members, or some new EU member states - to test the 
importance of the credit channel transmission of monetary policy;   
2) the adaptation of the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model with the  introduction of four 
ratios to represent the bank-performance conditions:  bank deposits/GDP; bonds and money 
market instruments/GDP; foreign assets/GDP; and foreign assets/foreign liabilities;  
3) the use of panel data estimations - polled panel OLS estimations and dynamic 
Arellano-Bond Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimations - not only to confirm the 
importance of the bank lending channel, but also to draw conclusions on the level of financial 
integration of the EU countries.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the contextual setting and 
the relevant literature; the methodological framework and the data are presented in Section 3; 
Section 4 displays the results obtained; finally in Section 5, we make our concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Contextual Setting and Literature  
In recent years and particularly during the last decade, the banking activity has had to adapt to 
profound transformations, due to advances in information and financial technologies and changes 
in institutional and regulatory conditions, together with shocks from the socio-economic and 
financial environment. 
In the EU, the structural changes arising first from the adoption of the single currency and a 
common monetary policy and then from the recent historically remarkable enlargement, which 
brought the entry of ten countries at the same time, followed shortly after by two more countries, 
have had a profound impact, not only in the Euro area but also throughout the entire EU-27, where 
the financial sector has experienced an intensification of competition in banking services. 
Some authors have already analysed the degrees of integration through the common trends which 
may be identified in the context of the pressures of globalisation and which affect all the EU 
countries (not only the EMU members) with particular intensity, due to the process of 
disintermediation, new technologies and increased competition (Belaisch et al., 2001; Gardener et 
al., 2002; Melnik and Nissim, 2006).  
The increasingly competitive environment of the EU banking sector and the process of 
concentration as well as the decline in the number of banks in almost all EU countries, did not 
eliminate much of the excess capacity in the system. Moreover, there is evidence that large banks 
continue to have efficiency advantages over the smaller banks (Altunbas et al., 1997; Cabral et al., 
2002; Casu and Molyneux, 2000; Jansen and de Haan, 2003; Molyneux, 2003; Baele et al., 2004; 
Romero-Ávila, 2003 and 2007).  
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In Barros et al. (2007), the efficiency of almost 1400 commercial banks operating in the EU 
between 1993 and 2001 was analysed. The study confirmed the importance of country-level 
characteristics and firm-level features to explain the probability of a bank being a best (worst) 
performer. In particular, we concluded that smaller-sized banks with higher loan intensity and 
foreign banks from countries upholding common law traditions have a higher probability of best 
performance. 
It is generally recognised that nowadays special attention must be paid to the EU banking sector 
following the most recent enlargements mentioned above, particularly regarding those countries 
formerly under the Soviet Union sphere of influence, given that in a quite short period of time, the 
banks in these countries moved from the structure of socialist banking, in which the financial 
organisations were used to support the central banking system, to a market economy and the 
concomitant decentralisation and liberalisation of the banking systems.  
In most of these Eastern and Central European countries, forms and programmes were introduced 
to amend property rights, together with processes of privatisations of part of the State property. As 
a result, the importance of the private sector and firms increased in these countries, as did the 
particularly relevant role of their financial intermediaries and banking institutions. There is a fairly 
strong consensus on the increased performance and efficiency of the banks under the new market 
conditions in these countries. Several studies (Holscher, 2000; Winkler, 2002; Backhaus, 2003; 
Sztyber, 2003; Hanousek and Kocenda, 2003; Stephen and Backhaus, 2003; Tchipev, 2003; 
Dimitrova, 2004; Bonin and Watchel, 2004;  Bonin et al, 2005-a, 2005-b; Freis and Taci, 2005; 
Fries et al., 2006) confirm the relevant improvements in efficiency of the banking systems of the 
new EU members and the effects of ownership, concluding that foreign-owned banks are usually 
more cost-efficient.  
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Other studies examine how, and to what extent, the banking sectors of the new member-states have 
integrated with those of the older EU members and the process of nominal and real convergence of 
these countries to EU standards (ECB, 2004 and 2005; Kocenda et al., 2006). 
The transmission of monetary policy to the non-monetary economic sectors also requires more 
efficient banking and the way that banks adapt lending in response to monetary policy decisions 
varies according to their specific political and economic environment. However, in spite of all the 
theoretical and empirical advances in this area, there is still no agreement about the precise 
specification of the ways in which monetary policy influences the economy. Thus, it is 
acknowledged as an area meriting further investigation (Goddart et al. 2007).  
Some contributions to the explanation of the classic interest-rate channel transmission of monetary 
policy (Taylor, 1995; Cecchetti, 1995; Bean et al., 2002) imply that the influence of interest rates 
on economic activity affects, at least, the components of domestic demand. Nowadays, the 
traditional interest-rate channel is not the only transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
Mishkin (1995, 2001) adds an asset-price channel and an exchange-rate channel, summing up the 
new different mechanisms as "other asset prices" and the "credit view".  
This credit channel may be seen as the development and extension of the conventional interest-rate 
effect (also developed by Bernanke and Getler, 1995, as well as Hubbard, 1995), taking into 
account the rising evaluation and monitoring costs for lenders, due to the information asymmetries 
in credit markets which provoke adverse selection and moral hazard effects.  
According to this credit view, monetary policy decisions will affect not only the credit demand 
side, through the balance sheet channel, but also the supply side, through the bank lending channel. 
More precisely, for instance, the tightening of monetary policy, through the balance sheet channel 
will make external finance more costly for borrowers with the increase of their interest expenses 
and the reduction of their collateral while, through the bank lending channel, the reduction of the 
banks’ liquidity will force banking institutions to reduce lending. 
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However, such a reduction also reflects the banks’ characteristics and the environment in which 
banks are operating. Lending by smaller and relatively under-capitalised or illiquid banks is 
usually more sensitive to interest rate movements (Kashyap and Stein, 1997, 2000; Kishan and 
Opiela, 2006). 
Recently, a number of empirical papers have tested the existence of a bank lending channel for the 
transmission of monetary policies in the Euro zone, obtaining rather similar conclusions on the 
relative homogeneity of the behaviour of the EU banking institutions (Erhmann et al., 2001; 
Fountas and Papagapitos, 2001; Topi and Vilmunen, 2001; Van Els et al., 2001; Worms, 2001; 
Altunbas et al., 2002; Angeloni et al., 2002; Gambacorta, 2004; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; 
Ferreira, 2007).  
Other contributions analyse the transmission channels of monetary policy in different EU 
countries, including the new member-states in Central and Eastern Europe (Golinelli and Rovelli, 
2005; Elbourne and de Haan, 2006; Ferreira, 2008).  
 
 
3. Methodological Framework and used  Data   
3.1. The Model 
The used model is an adaptation of the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model. 
In the money market, we will assume that money equals deposits held at banks by the non-
monetary sectors. So, for the demand function, we consider that the nominal deposits held in banks 
by the private sector will depend positively on the GDP and negatively on the interest rate on 
bonds:  
Where: 
Depd = deposits, d meaning demand 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
ibonds = interest rate on bonds 
a1 > 0 
a2 < 0 
[ ]1   i  aGDP aaDep bonds210d ++=
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On the other side, money supply will depend not only on the interest rate on bonds, but also on the 
influence of monetary policy (represented here by the relevant monetary policy interest rate, which 
is defined by the Central Bank): 
Now: 
Deps = deposits, s meaning supply 
ibonds = interest rate on bonds 
imon.pol. = monetary policy interest rate  
b1 > 0 
b2 < 0 
 
 
At the same time, in the credit market, the demand for lending depends positively on the GDP, 
negatively the interest rate on lending/borrowing and positively on the interest rate on bonds: 
Where:  
Lendd = bank lending, d meaning demand 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
ilend = interest rate on lending 
ibonds = interest rate on bonds 
c1 > 0 
c2 < 0 
c3 > 0 
 
 
Assuming the relevance of one or more bank-performance characteristics (Charx) which may exert  
either positive or negative influences on lending, we define the supply in the money market as 
depending on the deposits of the private sectors in banks, as well as on the bank characteristics, the 
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Lends = lending, s meaning supply 
Dep = bank deposits of the private sector 
Carx = bank characteristics (x = 1,..X) 
ilend = interest rate on lending 
ibonds = interest rate on bonds 
d1 > 0 
d2  may  be > 0 or  < 0  so  d2 = ? 
d3 > 0 
d4 < 0 
 
So, clearing the money market - equations [1] and [2] - we obtain: 
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e1 > 0 
e2 > 0 
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Clearing the credit market - equations [3] and [4] - we first obtain the expression of the interest 





g1 < 0 
g2 may  be > 0 or  < 0  so  g2 = ? 
g3 > 0 
g4 > 0 
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and introducing these expressions into the equation [8], we obtain the reduced form of the 
expression for lending, which is the basis of our estimations: 
 
Where: 
Lend = bank lending 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
imon.pol. = monetary policy interest rate  
Carx = bank characteristics  (x = 1,..X) 
α1  > 0   if  h2 > 0; otherwise   α1  may be < 0 ;    so  α1  = ? 
α2  > 0   if h2  > 0 and h2 e2 > h3 f2 ;  otherwise   α2  may be < 0 ;    so  α2  = ?     





3.2. The Data 
To build our panel, we use Eurostat and International Financial Statistics (IFS) quarterly data for 
the period from Q1 1999 to Q3 2006 (31 quarters) and 26 EU countries, amounting to 806 
observations. As mentioned previously, Luxembourg has been excluded, as it was not possible to 
collect all of the necessary data for this country.   
For the dependent variable (bank lending) we use the natural logarithm of the ratio of the domestic 
credit provided by the banking institutions to GDP. To explain the growth of this bank lending, we 
will consider (always in natural logarithms): 
1) The real GDP per capita, representing the macroeconomic conditions of the different EU 
countries;.  
2) The discount rate (end of the period) which is the monetary policy interest rate;   
3) The four ratios which represent the bank performance conditions, more precisely: 
3.1) the ratio deposits to GDP, that is, the total deposits in the banking institutions which are 
important sources of resources for credit lending. For instance, according to the 
[ ]9       Car αi αGDP ααLend
or






macroeconomic money multiplier mechanism, bank lending will mainly depend on the 
collected deposits and the legal minimum reserves; 
3.2) the ratio of the bonds and money market instruments to GDP, as a proxy of the 
development of the financial markets in these countries, which are mostly bank-dominated. 
Since healthy financial markets and developed financial institutions are a guarantee for the 
direct and indirect financing of the bank clients’ activities, we may expect that this ratio 
will exert a positive influence on bank lending; 
3.3) the ratio foreign assets to GDP, introducing the influence of the other countries, more 
specifically, the financial resources obtained from foreign partners, represented by the entry 
of assets, in particular to pay their debts and financial obligations, and consequently, more 
resources to be applied in the domestic bank lending; 
3.4) the ratio foreign assets to foreign liabilities, representing the financial situation of the 
banking institutions towards other countries, as they may receive payments from foreign 
debtors. On the other hand, they also have financial obligations towards foreign creditors, 
which implies the payment of debts and obligations to other countries. Therefore, the 
influence of this ratio on bank lending will reveal not only the openness of the financial 
markets, but mainly the degree of dependence on the other countries’ financial resources.  
In Appendix I, we present the summary statistics of these series, while the matrix of the 
correlations is presented in Appendix II. 
 
3.3. Unit Root Tests 
The collected data for 26 EU countries for a time period of 31 quarters (806 observations in total) 
does not lend itself to the application of single time series unit root tests. Therefore, we opt to use 
panel unit root tests, which are more adequate in this case. These tests not only increase the power 
of unit root tests due to the span of the observations, but also minimise the risks of structural 
breaks due to possible changes in policy regimes.  
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Among the available panel unit root tests, we choose the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test, which 
may be viewed as a pooled Dickey-Fuller test or as an augmented Dickey-Fuller test when lags are 
included, and the null hypothesis is the existence of non-stationarity. This test is adequate for 
heterogeneous panels of moderate size, as is the present case, and it assumes that there is a 
common unit root process.   
According to the results obtained with the deterministic constant and trend up to 3 lags (see 
Appendix III), the existence of the null hypothesis may be rejected for all the variables, mostly 
with no lags, except for the monetary policy interest rate when lags are equal to one or two, while 




4. Empirical Estimations 
Using the reduced form (equation [9] ) of the presented model,  and the series described above, we 
will explain the response of bank lending to relevant macroeconomic conditions, as well as to 
some specific characteristics of the banking institutions and indicators representing their 
performance conditions, by the estimation of the following equation (all variables in natural 
logarithms): 
 
(Bank Lending/GDP) it = ϕ 0 + ϕ 1 real GDP per cap.it + ϕ 2 Interest rate it + ϕ 3 
(Deposits/GDP) it + ϕ 4 (Bonds and Money Market Instruments/GDP) it + ϕ 5 (Foreign 
Assets/GDP) it + ϕ 6 (Foreign Assets/Foreign Liabilities) it + ηi + νt + uit  
 
Where: 
i = 1,..., 26 (EU countries) 
t = 1,..., 31 (quarters, between Q1 1999 and Q3 2006) 
ηi = country dummies 
νt = time (quarter) dummies 




So, with a panel of 806 observations, we will use a panel data approach which not only provides 
more observations for estimations, but also reduces the possibility of multi-collinearity among the 
different variables. 
To check for the robustness of the results and the relative importance of the macroeconomic, 
monetary policy and bank performance conditions for the explanation of the bank lending growth, 
we will present the results of three equations: the first including all the explaining variables; the 
second excluding the real GDP per capita but including all the other five explaining variables 
(monetary policy interest rate and the four ratios representing bank performance conditions); and 
the last equation explaining the bank lending growth only by the bank performance conditions. In 
our model these bank performance conditions are represented by: the ratio deposits/GDP, the ratio 
bonds and money market instruments/GDP; the ratio foreign assets/GDP and the ratio foreign 
assets/foreign liabilities. 
 
For the estimations, we will use: 
1) Pooled panel ordinary least squares (OLS) robust estimates, following Wooldridge (2002) and 
2) Dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimates, following the 
methodology developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Blundell and Bond (1998), Windmeijer 
(2000) and Bond (2002).  
 
 
 Pooled Panel OLS Robust Estimations 
With pooled total, ordinary least squares (OLS) robust estimates, we test the degree of integration 
assuming a common intercept and a single set of slope coefficients for all the panel observations.  
The obtained results for the three presented equations are reported in Table 1 and in all situations 
reveal consistency. In–line with the previously presented unit root tests, the best results were 
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obtained without any lagged variables1, indicating the dynamic and immediate reaction of bank 
lending growth to the real per-capita GDP growth, the monetary policy interest rate and the four 
bank performance indicators and conditions included in our model. 
(Take in Table 1) 
According to the results presented in Table 1, in all situations, only the ratio foreign assets to 
foreign liabilities has a negative influence on the bank lending growth, confirming the high degree 
of foreign dependence and indebtedness of the EU financial systems during this period. 
All the other explanatory variables contribute positively to bank lending growth. In addition, the 
relative high influence of the ratio of the bonds and money market instruments to GDP confirms 
that the EU financial and credit systems continue to be bank-dominated, since the increase of the 
bonds and money market instruments are in line with the bank lending growth. 
The positive contribution of the monetary policy interest rate to bank lending is not a surprise, in 
view of the fact that during this period, the ECB in particular, as well as the central banks of the 
non-EMU member-states, maintained interest rates at historically low levels, thereby contributing 
to the growth of the ratio bank lending to GDP.  
 
 Arellano Bond Dynamic Panel GMM Estimations 
In addition, we present the results obtained with dynamic Arellano-Bond panel GMM estimates 
(two-step difference), which consider the model as a system of equations, one for each time period. 
The equations differ by their individual moment condition sets, since they all include the 
endogenous and exogenous variables in first differences as instruments with suitable lags of their 
own levels. By this use of instruments based on lagged values of the explanatory variables, GMM 
controls for the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables, although only for “weak” 
endogeneity and not for full endogeneity, as explained by Bond (2002). 
                                                     
1 The results of the estimations including lagged variables are available from the author upon request. 
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Next, we will check for the quality of the estimations by the Hansen test for over-identifying 
restrictions and the Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation.  
(Take in Table 2) 
Table 2 reports the obtained results with dynamic Arellano-Bond two-step difference GMM 
estimations for the three presented equations. Now, reinforcing the conclusions of the presented 
unit root tests, the best results in statistical terms are obtained with lagged values, but only for the 
monetary policy interest rate and for the ratio bonds and money market instruments to GDP.   
In all situations, the Hansen test clearly does not reject the null that the instruments are valid and 
that they are not correlated with the errors. At the same time, according to the results for the 
Arellano-Bond tests, and as required for the validity of the instruments, we may always accept that 
the residuals are clearly MA (1), but not MA (2).  
Furthermore, except for the growth of the real GDP per capita2 (included only in equation 1), all 
the results obtained with Arellano Bond dynamic GMM estimates are in line with those obtained 
with the pooled panel OLS estimates.  
With regard to real growth of the GDP per capita, we know that while it may be possible to admit a 
positive relation between real GDP growth and bank lending growth, it may also be true that 
during at least some of the considered time periods, bank lending was not so directly connected 
with the productive activities. This may be due either to the relatively independent and more 
productive financing of the productive activities, or to the channelling of credit towards less 
productive activities, such as home buying or private consumption, with no remarkable future 




                                                     
2 To check the robustness of these results, we estimate several equations with and without lags and in all situations 
with Arellano-Bond GMM estimates (two-step difference), the real GDP per capita has a negative influence on the 
bank lending to GDP. The results are available upon request. 
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5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper confirms the high degree of integration among the EU financial systems, as well as the 
importance of bank performance conditions to the credit-lending channel of monetary policy in the 
EU countries during recent years.  
We contribute to the existing empirical evidence by the introduction into an adaptation of the 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model not only of the real GDP per capita or the monetary policy 
interest rate, but also of some specific variables, representing the bank performance conditions, to 
explain bank lending to GDP, namely, the ratio bank deposits/GDP; the ratio bonds and money 
market instruments/GDP, the ratio foreign assets/GDP and the ratio foreign assets/foreign 
liabilities. 
The consistency of the obtained results, using pooled OLS and dynamic Arellano-Bond GMM 
panel estimations, allows us to conclude that the EU banking institutions have similar reactions to 
the variations of the macroeconomic conditions, in particular to the monetary policy interest rates 
as well as to the variations of the bank performance conditions. The results also confirm the 
importance of these variables to the bank lending growth (more precisely, the growth of the ratio 
of the domestic credit provided by the banking institutions to GDP) in the EU countries.  
With reference to the real GDP per capita, the obtained results, although statistically robust, are 
inconclusive as to the positive or negative influence of this variable on the bank lending to GDP 
growth during this period. With OLS robust estimates, which consider a fully integrated panel, 
with common intercept and a single set of slope coefficients, we conclude that a faster growth of 
the real GDP per capita will contribute to a faster growth of the bank lending to GDP growth. 
However, when using Arellano-Bond GMM estimations, which consider the model as a system of 
equations, one for each time period, we found a negative influence of the real GDP per-capita 
growth to bank lending growth.  
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Thus, we may conclude that, in at least some of the considered time periods, bank lending was not 
positively related to the real GDP per capita growth. This may be true in some EU countries, where 
the historically low levels of interest rates oriented bank credit to many non-productive activities. 
These results are corroborated with the clear positive contributions of the monetary policy interest 
rate to bank lending growth.  
Furthermore, the results obtained with the four included bank performance conditions allow us to 
state that: 
• the growth of the ratio deposits to GDP exerts a positive influence on the bank lending 
growth, confirming the intermediate role of financial institutions and the fact that the capacity to 
attract savings (in the form of deposits) is always a good condition in which to provide credit to 
those who need financing;  
• the growth of the ratio bonds and money market instruments to GDP, which can be 
considered as a proxy of the development of the financial markets in the EU countries, also 
contribute positively to bank lending. This is symptomatic not only of the fact that the EU 
financial markets continue to be bank-dominated, but also that the development of the financial 
systems is always a good condition for the direct and indirect financing of the bank clients’ 
activities; 
• as expected, the growth of the ratio foreign assets to GDP also exerts a positive influence 
on the bank lending growth, as the entry of foreign assets received from the other countries 
increases the resources to concede credit to the domestic banks’ clients; 
• the growth of the ratio foreign assets to foreign liabilities contributes negatively to the 
domestic bank lending growth, revealing not only the openness of the financial markets,  but more 
importantly, their indebtedness and the dependence of the EU banking institutions on other 
countries’ financial resources. 
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Finally, it is clear that the total credit provided by the UE banking institutions depends on the 
macro-economic conditions, and particularly on the monetary policy decisions. At the same time, 
bank lending is an essential transmission channel of monetary policy decisions, but it still depends 
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APPENDIX I – Summary Statistics  
VARIABLES  
(all in natural 
logarithms) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Bank 
Lending/GDP: 
     
overall .9634144      1.106034 -3.23828   3.39354 N =    806 
between  1.10247     -2.791806 3.356673 n =     26 
within  .2305816     .0820338 3.117834 T =      31 
Real GDP per 
capita: 
     
overall 6.051168      2.678176 1.34968 12.66796 N =    806 
between  2.72726      1.443205 12.42524 n =     26 
within  .1089511     5.524108 6.514988 T =      31 
Interest rate:      
overall 1.481935      .56964 -.02703 3.55535 N =    806 
between  .4792346      .7142648 3.06961 n =     26 
within  .3215321      .4369553 2.581846 T =      31 
Deposits/GDP:      
overall 1.295129      1.519575 -2.77394 6.04847 N =    806 
between  1.528612    -2.488646 5.997196 n =     26 
within  .2439945    -.3845842 1.981864 T =      31 
Bonds and Money 
Market 
Instruments/GDP: 
     
overall -.0795288     1.750138 -5.39641   2.28638 N =    806 
between  1.695878    -3.744695 1.986973 n =     26 
within  .5423645    -2.622679 1.495851 T =      31 
Foreign 
Assets/GDP : 
     
overall -.080594      2.21202 -10.41371 3.23734 N =    806 
between  2.240099    -9.21917   2.771957 n =     26 




     
overall -.0051242     .7618599 -2.47735   2.88475 N =    806 
between  .6818787    -1.203865 2.336299 n =     26 
within  .3644169    -1.446609 2.090331 T =      31 
 








































      




     
Interest rate -0.4227    0.1853 1.0000 
 
    
Deposits/ 
GDP 
0.7154   -0.1843  -0.3777 1.0000 
 














































APPENDIX III – Panel unit root tests – Levin-Lin-Chu 
 















 1 -0.50974      -15.206 2.11907 0.9830 725 
 2 -0.40864      -10.955 9.39903 1.0000 700 
 3 -0.38976      -11.328 10.91595 1.0000 675 
       














 1 -1.57624      -38.559 -26.68914  0.0000 725 
 2 -1.89295      -26.221 -7.30147 0.0000 700 
 3 -0.37484      -8.712 25.39089 1.0000 675 
       
       
Interest rate 0 -0.16644      -8.404 0.48152 0.6849 750 
 1 -0.22246      -14.416 -5.64454 0.0000 725 
 2 -0.26835      -15.240 -5.20633 0.0000 700 
 3 -0.29185      -13.809 -1.49730 0.0672 675 















 1 -0.38278      -11.697 -2.25471 0.0121 725 
 2 -0.30752      -9.013 1.43541 0.9244 700 
 3 -0.24927      -7.173 4.77273 1.0000 675 
       





















 1 -0.22969      -9.423 -0.19688    0.4220 725 
 2 -0.20166      -7.782 2.50132 0.9938 700 
 3 -0.34266      -12.507 -2.97402 0.0015 675 















 1 -0.29557      -10.280 -0.78186 0.2171 725 
 2 -0.28142      -8.924 1.69569 0.9550 700 
 3 -0.31657      -9.217 2.43607 0.9926 675 









-0.17329      
 
 
-9.362    
 
 







 1 -0.19161      -9.696   -1.77454    0.0380 725 
 2 -0.20652      -9.886 -1.47377    0.0703 700 










Table 1 – Pooled OLS Robust Estimations (*) 
 EQUATION I EQUATION II EQUATION III 
Real GDP per capita    
coef. .3054466   
T-statistic 2.73   
P-value 0.006   
Interest rate    
coef. .108883 .0944373  
T-statistic 3.28 2.77     
P-value 0.001 0.006  
Deposits/ 
GDP 
   
coef. .1937137   .2126949 .1918622 
T-statistic 3.84 4.16 3.77 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Bonds and Money 
Market 
Instruments/GDP 
   
coef. .1401866   .1427856 .159362 
T-statistic 6.78 7.02 8.20 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Assets/GDP    
coef. .1706834 .1625786 .1774548 
T-statistic 4.45 4.40 4.92 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Assets/Foreign 
Liabilities 
   
coef. -.135372    -.1475844 -.1393685 
T-statistic -5.44 -6.11 -5.68 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
constant    
coef. -.5142468 .8122658 .97971 
T-statistic -1.10 5.93 9.23 
P-value 0.270 0.000 0.000 
    
 N =  806 N =  806 N =  806 
 F (61, 744) = 
1119.72 
Prob>F=0.0000 
F (60, 745) = 
1226.02 
Prob>F=0.0000 
F (59, 746) = 
1237.57 
Prob>F=0.0000 
 R-squared= 0.9773 R-squared= 0.9769 R-squared= 0.9766 
 
(*) Time and country dummies were included in the estimations and the obtained results are available 
upon request. 





Table 2 – Arellano Bond Dynamic Panel GMM Two-Step Difference Estimations  
 EQUATION I EQUATION II EQUATION III 
Real GDP per capita    
coef. -.1541594      
z -6.01   
P>|z| 0.000   
Interest rate (lag1)    
coef. .0530916    .0512398     
z 4.97   4.30  
P>|z| 0.000 0.000  
Deposits/ 
GDP 
   
coef. .4676554    .4839136    .5198482    
z 22.21 18.63 20.54 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 




   
coef. .2189317         .1646729    .0797324    
z 8.16 8.69 4.13 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Assets/GDP    
coef. .0611868       .0809159    .086716         
z 3.87 4.90 8.26 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Assets/Foreign 
Liabilities 
   
coef. -.1879588    -.1997773     -.1983791       
z -8.67 -10.83 -25.70 
P>|z| 0.000 0.008 0.000 
    
 N =  702 N =  702 N =  702 
 
Hansen test of 
overid. restrictions: 
 
    
  chi2(129) =    21.30  
Prob > chi2 =  1.000
 
     chi2(130) =    24.46 
Prob > chi2 =  1.000
     
 chi2(131) =    22.67  
Prob > chi2 =  1.000
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(1) in first 
differences:  
z =  -1.88 
Pr > z =  0.060 
z =  -2.30 
Pr > z =  0.022 
z =  -1.93 
Pr > z =  0.053 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first 
differences:  
z =  -0.36 
Pr > z =  0.719 
z =  -0.67 
Pr > z =  0.501 
z =  -0.75 
Pr > z =  0.456 
 
         
 
 
